The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and Externalist Theory Theory: For Compatibility, Against Collapse by Slors, M.V.P.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/82380
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
Marc Slors
The Narrative Practice
Hypothesis and Externalist
Theory Theory
For Compatibility, Against Collapse1
Abstract: What defence does the Narrative Practice Hypothesis
(NPH) have against the charge that it is a covert form of externalist
theory theory (TT)? I discuss and reject Dan Hutto’s own strategies
and argue that the NPH remains vulnerable to a threat of collapse
into externalist TT as long as narrative folk-psychological explana-
tion is differentiated from simple belief-desire explanation merely by
a degree of complexity, subtlety and/or context-sensitivity. It is
entirely plausible, however, that there is a more principled distinction
between these two types of explanation of human behaviour. I defend
such a distinction and show how it eliminates the threat of collapse
into TT entirely.
According to Dan Hutto’s narrative practice hypothesis (NPH)
(Hutto, 2004; 2007; 2008a; 2008b) folk-psychology (FP) is funda-
mentally a narrative competence. This hypothesis is explicitly
intended to replace the notion of FP as a folk-theory of mind (ToM).
Given the variety of notions of ‘theory’ in this domain, though, it may
not be entirely clear whether and to what extent the NPH is really
incompatible with everyone’s understanding of FP as a theory. In this
paper, I will argue that the NPH, as presented and defended by Hutto,
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faces a threat of collapse into some version of what is known as the
‘externalist’ variety of the so-called theory theory of folk-psychology
(ETT). However, I will also argue that this threat can be avoided by
accepting a principled distinction between simple belief-desire
explanations of actions and full-blown narrative reason-explanations.
The paper is set-up as follows: in Section 1 I shall outline the NPH
and its superficial resemblance to externalist TT. I shall also identify
two arguments employed by Hutto against externalist TT, of which I
will claim only one can serve as Hutto’s main defence against a possi-
ble collapse of the NPH into a form of TT: the rejection of mental
holism. In section 2, I shall argue that this rejection of mental holism is
incompatible with the ontological commitments of the NPH. More-
over, I shall argue that this rejection does not, as Hutto takes it, follow
from the empirical facts. This renders the threat of collapse into TT all
too real for the NPH. In Section 3, however, I will explain why the
NPH does not collapse into TT. I shall argue that the narrative element
in folk-psychological reason explanations is an addition to belief-
desire psychology rather than an extension of it. While externalist TT
may explain belief-desire psychology, this additional narrative ele-
ment is out of its reach. Hence, the possible compatibility of
externalist TT with the NPH does not amount to a collapse of the NPH
into a form of TT. Moreover the claim of the NPH that TT does not
fully capture real-life folk-psychological explanations remains intact.
1. The Narrative Practice Hypothesis and
Externalist Theory Theory
Let me start by outlining the NPH, its possible compatibility with
externalist TT and Hutto’s principled reason to reject this compatibility.
1.1 The NPH
The NPH is a theory about the nature and acquisition of folk-psycho-
logical (FP) competence that differs considerably from either of the
only two options available up until recently: the theory theory (TT)
and the simulation theory (ST). It has managed to carve out a theoreti-
cal niche for itself by subtly, and plausibly, changing the subject of the
debate on FP. FP, according to Hutto, is not a spectator sport. It doesn’t
serve the purpose of predicting or explaining behaviour from a disen-
gaged third-personal standpoint. Rather, it serves the purpose of facil-
itating social interaction, which requires, most of the time, an engaged
second-person perspective. Thus, what needs to be explained is pri-
marily our ability to render actions intelligible in a socially acceptable
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fashion in order to facilitate our daily dealings with each other. This is
done by giving reasons for actions. Reason-giving according to the
NPH is storytelling, not theorizing.
The idea that reason-giving is theorizing is propounded by all ver-
sions of the TT. But also by the dominant version of ST (e.g.
Goldman, 2006). For ‘if simulation plays a vital role in the process of
understanding others, it does so by feeding the outcomes of operations
involving recreative/enactment imagination or co-cognition into theo-
rizing activity that brings ToM [Theory of Mind] principles into play’
(Hutto, 2008b, p. 177). When it comes to explaining our acquisition of
FP competence, TT and dominant versions of ST commit us to innate
or acquired ToM abilities; extreme cases of such a commitment are
ToM modules (Leslie, 1992; 1994) or child-as-scientist hypothesis
(Gopnik, 1996; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992).
Hutto forcefully argues against both (Hutto, 2008a, pp. 143–77).
There is no need to buy into the strong cognitivism that infuses the tra-
ditional ToM views on FP acquisition. The basis from which we can
explain the acquisition of FP competence, rather, is what Hutto labels
‘unprincipled bodily engagements’. These are our non-conceptual,
embodied, primitive, but at times remarkably intelligent interactive
capacities. Hutto explains how the use of language allows us to trans-
form those engagements into the FP interactions of our daily lives
(Hutto, 2008a, pp. 87–100; 129–42). In this explanation, typical
folk-psychological concepts such as ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are normally
acquired in the course of our early development (see next section), but
start to acquire their full use only when children develop the capacity
to understand and create narratives. Hutto: ‘(…) children come into
possession of all the pieces needed for playing the understanding-
action-in-terms-of-reasons game before they can actually play it.
What they are missing in their early years is not the necessary compo-
nents, but knowledge of the basic rules’ (2008a, p. 27). But in fact,
‘rules’ still sounds too theoretical as the term designating the FP ‘prin-
ciples’ that interrelate beliefs and desires. The point is that
‘[a]ccording to the NPH these “principles” are revealed to children
not as a series of rules but by showing them in action, through
narratives, in their normal context of operation’ (2008a, p. 29).
Thus — and that is one of its aims — the NPH explains the nature
and acquisition of our ability to understand and explain actions in
terms of beliefs, desires and reasons within an enactivist, embodied,
non-representationalist view of ‘the mental’.
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1.2 Externalist TT
In their (1994), Stich and Ravenscroft distinguish between what they
call ‘internalist’ and ‘externalist’ conceptions of FP. Since I will be
interested in the theory theory of FP only in this section, the relevant
distinction to make is between internalist TT (ITT) and externalist TT
(ETT). ITT is the prototypical sort of TT that the NPH argues against;
it is the theory according to which our FP capacities are grounded in
an innate or acquired theory of human psychology that is represented
in our minds/brains. The NPH is incompatible with ITT. Those who
suspect that the NPH may be compatible with TT must have a version
of ETT in mind.
Stich and Ravenscroft introduce the externalist reading of FP and in
effect ETT as follows:
We might equally well elect to use the term ‘folk psychology’ in a way
that is more akin to Lewis’ usage — as a label for the collection of folk
psychological ‘platitudes’ that people in our culture readily recognize
and assent to. Or, since the collection of ‘platitudes’ is likely to be large
and ungainly, we might reserve the label ‘folk psychology’ for a set of
more abstract generalizations — a ‘theory’ if you will — that system-
atizes the platitudes in a perspicuous way and that (perhaps in conjunc-
tion with some other commonly known information) entails them. That
systematization might well invoke terms and concepts that are quite
unfamiliar to ordinary folk, in the same way that an attempt to system-
atize our linguistic intuitions probably would (Stich and Ravenscroft,
1994, p. 460).
According to ETT, FP-as-a-theory is present, not necessarily in our
minds/brains, but in our FP practices. That is, our actual practice of
understanding and explaining actions in terms of beliefs, desires and
reasons, is supposed to be structured by a system of principles or
rules. We need not be aware of this system, just like we are not aware
of the rules of the grammar of the language we speak. But just like our
actual speech and writing displays systematicity on closer inspection,
so does our FP practice.
Is ETT ruled out by the NPH? It depends. Of course, the presence of
FP-as-a-theory in our practices might be explained in terms of our
possessing an internal theory of mind, that is, in terms of a theory rep-
resented in our brains (i.e. ETT and ITT are not necessarily mutually
exclusive). Since the NPH is hostile to ITT, such a version of ETT will
be incompatible with it. But to the extent that ETT does not invoke
ITT, some version of it may well fit in with the enactivist anti-
representationalism of the NPH. Why would it not be the case that
even though we acquire FP competences through exposure to
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narratives, what we in fact learn through such exposure is how to use
and apply the implicit rules of an (external) FP theory?
It is this possibility that I would like to investigate in this paper.
Although I shall indicate in the third section why I think the NPH is
not a covert version of ETT, I will first argue that Hutto’s own argu-
ments against the compatibility of ETT with the NPH are not convinc-
ing. In order to do that, I will have to be more precise about which
variety of ETT is most likely to be compatible with the NPH.
For even versions of ETT that shun an explanation of the alleged
theoretical nature of our FP practices in terms of an internal FP-theory
had by the practitioners might be incompatible with the NPH. ETT
might construe FP such that ‘the folk’ conceive of beliefs and desires
as theoretical postulates ‘similar to electrons, atoms, or gravity’
(Hutto, 2008a, p. 32). And such a view of the propositional attitudes is
exactly what the NPH seeks to avoid and replace. To explain an action
in terms of its reasons is not, according to the NPH, to hypothesize an
explanans of that action in the form of private, internal beliefs and
desires that are hidden from view. Rather, it is to situate that action in
what Hutto calls a FP narrative. In FP explanations, according to
Hutto, beliefs and desires operate as parts of narrative descriptions of
actions; they are not theoretical postulates.
But there is a different class of theoretical postulates than electrons
and atoms that Hutto seems to be overlooking. Consider Mendel’s
postulate of genes at the time when he formulated his laws of genetics.
Before the discovery that genes are in fact DNA (or are realized by
DNA), genes are defined not as determinate entities, but rather as the
causal roles played by some entity. As e.g. David Lewis (1966; 1972)
noted, mental states such as beliefs and desires can be defined simi-
larly, in terms of the causal role they play. ‘A mental state M (say, an
experience)’ according to Lewis ‘is definable as the occupant of a cer-
tain causal role R — that is, as the state, of whatever sort, that is caus-
ally connected in specified ways to sensory stimuli, motor responses,
and other mental states’ (Lewis, 1972, pp. 249–50). Accordingly,
Lewis conceived of FP as a term-introducing theory that fixes the vari-
ous causal roles mental state types are said to play relative to each
other according to the users of FP. This is a form of ETT: Lewis says
nothing about internal theories of mind (see also e.g. Jackson, 1998;
Braddon-Mitchel & Jackson, 2007).
Some variant of this form of ETT may seem like a contender for
being compatible with the NPH. But refinements are in order still. For,
on the one hand it may be argued that electrons and atoms can also, on
closer inspection, be defined in terms of their causal or theoretical
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roles. On the other hand, genes turn out to be identical with DNA, a
complex molecule, i.e. something with a status similar to atoms and
electrons. In order to circumvent this problem and to keep the distinc-
tion between the types of theoretical postulate I wish to employ intact
(in the present context this is the role-realiser distinction, but I will
broaden the distinction later on), we may note that mental states as
causal role states are multiply realisable: the same causal role state can
be realised at different times or in different individuals by different
neural structures.2 Mental states are thus not type-identical with neu-
ral states, and explanations of actions in terms of beliefs and desires
cannot be reduced to explanations in terms of neural causes. Hence,
mental states as causal role states have a status that is different from
genes as a causal roles concept in that type-identification with some
definite objective physical item is not feasible. Mental states as causal
role states may be the postulates of a term-introducing theory, but that
certainly doesn’t mean they are like electrons, atoms or gravity.
To be sure, the claim here is not that the NPH or Hutto’s position in
general is compatible with Lewis’s views on FP or psychophysical
identification in terms of a role-realiser relation. The claim is that a
version of ETT that depicts FP as a term-introducing theory that
defines mental states in terms of multiply realisable causal role states
seems compatible with the NPH. Such a version of TT does not
postulate an internal theory of mind and neither does it portray FP as
a theory that postulates entities similar to electrons and atoms.
The crucial move here is to distinguish between theoretical postu-
lates that are obviously incompatible with the enactivist anti-
representationalism of the NPH and those that are not. The distinction
between roles and realisers helps, in this respect, but other distinctions
may help too. Daniel Dennett, for instance, doesn’t conceive of beliefs
and desires as causal role states. But he does conceive them as theoret-
ical postulates that are different from electrons, atoms and gravity, i.e.
different from what Reichenbach called illata. Beliefs and desires,
according to Dennett, are abstracta — theoretical postulates like cen-
tres of gravity or vectors — that capture and predict our behavioural
regularities, perhaps not accurately to the last detail but certainly fast,
practical and effective. On his view, there is no need to postulate any
neural realisation as concretely isomorphic to them as occupiers of
causal roles:
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Jacques shoots his uncle dead in Trafalgar square and is apprehended on
the spot by Sherlock; Tom reads about it in the Guardian and Boris
learns of it in Pravda. Now Jacques, Sherlock, Tom and Boris have had
remarkably different experiences (…) but there is one thing they share:
they all believe that a Frenchman has committed murder in Trafalgar
square. (…) Ordinary folk-psychologists have no difficulty imputing
such useful but elusive commonalities to people. If they insist that in
doing so, they are postulating a similarly structured object in each head,
this is a gratuitous bit of misplaced concreteness (Dennett, 1987,
pp. 54–5).
Folk-psychologists may be depicted as theorists, in Dennett’s scheme,
but only in a particular sense. FP is not a theory that refers to concrete
entities in order to explain and predict behaviour, regardless of what
either philosophers or FP users think (Dennett, 1995). But the
abstracta invoked by FP are, according to Dennett, structured into
what may be described as a theory about ‘the performance specifica-
tions of believers’ (Dennett, 1987, p. 59). Here too, the claim is not
that Dennett’s position is entirely compatible with the NPH. The claim
is merely that ETT might be conceived roughly along Dennettian
lines, and that such a version of TT appears prima facie compatible
with the NPH.
The ways in which Dennett and Lewis set apart causal role states
and abstracta from the kind of theoretical postulate that is incompati-
ble with the NPH requires reference to a form of mental holism. It is
through defining beliefs and desires in terms of their holistic interrela-
tion with each other and with contextualised behaviour that it
becomes possible to conceive of them as something other than the
concrete theoretical postulates — the illata — that the NPH denies to
be at play in FP. Thus, Dennett explicitly claims that mental states are
defined holistically within FP while Lewis conceives of FP as a huge
theoretical sentence in which mentalistic terms such as ‘belief’ or ‘de-
sire’ can be replaced by variables that play specific causal roles as
defined by the Ramsey sentence of FP as a whole. Mental holism is a
non-accidental aspect of the kind of ETT that may, as I argued, appear
compatible with the NPH. This is important for what is to follow.
1.3 Hutto’s arguments against ETT
Hutto’s attacks on TT focus primarily on ITT and there is little atten-
tion for ETT. As far as I can see Hutto offers two arguments against
the kind of ETT that I claimed to be prima facie compatible with the
NPH in the previous subsection. One partly implicit strategy, to be
found throughout Hutto’s (2008a), is his claim that the mental holism
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that is crucial for the kind of ETT that may be compatible with the
NPH is in fact refuted by facts from developmental psychology.
Another strategy is Hutto’s later argument (2008b) that the Lewis-
style version of ETT that might appear compatible with the NPH can-
not be considered a proper theory. I take this argument to be applicable
as well to a Dennett-style ETT. In this subsection I shall outline both
arguments. I will start with the second one and argue that it fails, leav-
ing the first argument as Hutto’s main buffer against the claim that the
NPH may turn out to be another form of TT.
The basic idea behind the second argument is that when ETT con-
ceives of FP as a theory that is implicitly present in our daily practices
(rather than in our heads), then ‘(…) “theory” is surely the wrong
word since the second T in TT would not denote a “theory” in any
interesting or substantive sense. (…) [It] would not be an articulation
of the “principles” used by folk psychological practitioners in making
their everyday attributions, predictions or explanations. [They] would
not be (…) used by the folk in their daily routines any more than New-
tonian laws are used by planets in order to conduct their business’
(2008b, p. 180).
I am not convinced that this is a good argument. Consider a parallel
example: Suppose we reject a Chomskian view of natural language
according to which all language users possess some internally (i.e.
neurally) stored generative grammar; language is grammatical, to be
sure, but the grammar is present in our linguistic practices, so to
speak, not in our heads. We gain knowledge of our grammar, on such a
view, by carefully observing and analysing the principles at play in
our linguistic practices. But does this view imply that if we gain such
knowledge, ‘it would not be an articulation of the “principles” used by
[linguistic] practitioners’? There surely is a strong tendency to speak
of principles used by people here. So if there is not a similar tendency
to describe the planets as using Newtonian laws we must explain the
difference. Hutto’s argument assumes that we can’t explain the
difference. I think we can. I will stick to FP while explaining it.
Crucially, planets are objects and folk-psychologists are agents.
That is, unlike planets, folk-psychologists initiate their own actions,
in this case the acts of interpretation of each other’s behaviour. In that
sense, planets are governed by Newtonian laws (at least for the sake of
this argument) while folk-psychologists are not in a similar way gov-
erned by the principles of externalist FP. Folk-psychologists may, in
Dennett’s terminology, choose to apply the intentional strategy (i.e.
apply FP), but they may also opt for a design strategy or a physical
strategy. Or they may apply a faulty or idiosyncratic version of FP.
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Precisely because there are options and precisely because the
folk-psychologist herself decides on one of these options while initiat-
ing the act of FP interpretation, it is natural to express this by saying
that she uses the FP strategy (rather than some other strategy) to
interpret someone’s actions.
The fact that the folk-psychologist is likely not to be able to state
explicitly the principles of the strategy she is using does not block this
conclusion. Many language users are unable to formulate the gram-
matical principles at play in their speech. To demand that folk-psy-
chologists be able to state the principles of FP in order to count as
using FP-as-a-theory would be to discount almost all forms of TT. For
the huge majority of TT-ists claim that FP-as-a-theory is used
implicitly.
Hutto’s later argument against ETT, then, fails to convince. What
remains is the strategy applied against ETT in his 2008 book: the
rejection of mental holism. Here Hutto reasons as follows: The ability
of children to understand moderately complex narratives (of the kind
Hutto claims are involved in the acquisition of FP competence) devel-
ops after children acquire the concepts of desires and beliefs. For this
reason, Hutto emphasizes at different occasions that these narratives
are not responsible for introducing an understanding of mental con-
cepts, such as desire and belief for the first time, rather (...) they put on
show how these attitudes can integrate with one another (...). The NPH
assumes that kids already have a practical grasp on what it is to have a
desire or belief before learning how to integrate their discrete under-
standing of these concepts in making sense of actions in terms of rea-
sons. FP narratives enable this by showing how these core attitudes and
other mental states behave in situ (Hutto, 2008b, p. 178).
Conveniently, this separation of (the grasp of) FP concepts (e.g.
beliefs and desires) from (the grasp of) the ‘principles’ interrelating
them in FP explanations of actions allows Hutto to distance himself
from the kind of mental holism involved in the kind of ETT that I
argued to be possibly compatible with the NPH. Hutto:
(…) the claim that the meaning of mental predicates depends wholly on
their lawful relations is apparently undermined by the fact that children
develop a practical understanding of the different propositional atti-
tudes at distinct stages in their careers. Thus they have a grasp of the
concept of desire, quite independently of and prior to having an under-
standing of the roles they play in making sense of a person’s reason for
action. And an understanding of both of these attitudes appears to pre-
cede an understanding of the roles they play in making sense of a per-
son’s action (Hutto, 2008a, p. 31).
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This, then, is the principled ground on which Hutto is able to claim
that the NPH is not a covert version of ETT.
2. Belief-Desire Interaction and the Threat of Collapse
So, in (my reconstruction of) Hutto’s view, in order to safeguard the
NPH from collapsing into a form of TT, it is crucial to claim that ‘chil-
dren come into the possession of all the pieces needed for playing the
understanding-actions-in-terms-of-reasons game before they can
actually play it’ (Hutto, 2008a, p. 27). In this section I will argue that
this principled distinction between ‘the pieces’ and ‘the game’ or ‘the
FP components’ (propositional attitudes and other psychological
states) and the ‘principles’ interrelating them, cannot be upheld. I will
argue that the distinction is hard to square with Hutto’s anti-
internalistic, interpretationist view of the mind, and that the develop-
mental psychological data Hutto invokes to argue for this distinction
do not in fact show what he takes them to show. Finally, I will trace the
NPH’s threat of collapse into TT back to what I take to be its root: the
assumption that narrative reason explanation is continuous with sim-
ple belief-desire psychology on a scale of increasing complexity.
Rejecting that assumption, I will argue, should be the strategy for
avoiding a collapse.
2.1 Mental holism in view of Hutto’s interpretationism
One of the features (and according to many, including myself, attrac-
tions) of the NPH is that it offers a complete account of human action
and interaction without drawing on a traditional notion of ‘mind’ as
involving internal representations (such as in the mental realist posi-
tions that gave rise to ITT), or even a notion of mental states that calls
for a theoretical account of tractable neural implementation (such as
offered e.g. by Lewis). On the one hand, the unprincipled engage-
ments from which our narratively guided FP practices grow involve
intentional but not propositional attitudes. To apply the notion of men-
tal content at this level would be to miss the point (Hutto, 2008a,
ch. 3). On the other hand, the high-level reason talk of FP gets its
explanation at the socio-cultural rather than the neuro-psychological
level. At this level there are mental contents, but these cannot be
traced back or reduced to the neural structures of the people to whom
the relevant mental states are ascribed.
What, ontologically speaking, is it to ascribe a belief or a desire to
someone on this picture? I think the answer here should be that the
position Hutto advocates is some form of interpretationism, probably
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of a more Davidsonian than Dennettian kind. Just like Hutto argues
that to have a concept of ‘belief’ is to have certain social abilities
(2008a, p. 129–31), I take it that on his account to ascribe a belief is to
interpret someone’s behaviour so as to allow or express the possibility
of specific interactions. FP in Hutto’s conception is, as Dennett (1995)
puts it, ‘a craft’, not a description or theory (it should be said, though,
that Hutto’s interpretationism is not as permissive as Dennett’s; see
2008a, pp. 42–3).
The point I wish to make in this section is that interpretationism is
usually taken to involve a degree of mental holism that appears to con-
tradict the assumption that it is possible to possess the components of
FP, i.e. be able to apply the concepts of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, in
abstraction from knowing how these components interact (cf. Malpas,
1992, ch. 3). This is best illustrated by cases in which the FP interpre-
tation is underdetermined by the action at issue. An example may help
to convey the idea. Suppose I am at a birthday party and I see my 11
year old nephew reach for a glass of beer that is on the table. Since I do
not believe he desires beer, I will attribute to him the belief that there
is, say, apple juice in the glass, because I know that’s what he likes.
Then I realize that it is common these days for young children to boast
about drinking alcohol. Maybe he is impressed by stories of class-
mates and doesn’t want to stay behind. In that case I should attribute to
him the desire to drink beer and the belief that there is beer in the glass.
What a simple example such as this shows is that the ascription of
beliefs and desires are linked. I cannot, when altering my interpreta-
tion of my nephew, merely alter, say, the desire I ascribe to him and
leave the belief intact; there’s no point in reaching for a glass of apple
juice when you want a beer. Typically, it is the assumption of rational-
ity that interpretationists refer to when explaining why we ascribe
beliefs and desires in pairs, and not atomistically.
But are beliefs and desires always invoked in tandem? Take another
example:
The boy’s sign says ‘LEMONADE — 12 cents a glass.’ I hand him a
quarter, he gives me a glass of lemonade and then a dime and a penny
change. He’s made a mistake. Now what can we expect from him when
we point out his error to him? That he will exhibit surprise, blush, smite
his forehead, apologize, and give me two cents. Why do we expect him
to exhibit surprise? Because we attribute to him the belief that he’s
given me the right change — he’ll be surprised to learn that he hasn’t
(…). Why do we expect him to blush? Because we attribute to him the
desire not to cheat (or be seen to cheat) his customers (Dennett, 1987,
p. 84).
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Here it seems that the surprise is explained by the boy’s belief that he
has given the right change. The blushing on the other had is explained
by his desire not to cheat. At first glance there is no belief-desire inter-
action. And since this example is from an uncontaminated inter-
pretationist source, it may seem to show that interpretationism does
allow for the possibility to ascribe beliefs and desires without being
aware of how these interrelate. If that were the case, Hutto can have
his cake and eat it; he can stick to an interpretationist ontology of the
propositional attitudes and accept (at least in some cases) the kind of
mental atomism that is required by his separation of FP components
from FP ‘principles’.
But on closer inspection it is not true that there is no belief-desire
interaction in examples such as these. Why would the boy blush if he
didn’t believe he might be seen as having cheated? Or look at the
bracketed phrase in the last sentence of the quote. It matters whether
the boy doesn’t want to cheat or whether he does want to cheat but
doesn’t want to be seen cheating. In the former case the expression of
surprise is explained by his belief to have given the right change. In
the latter case, the expression is explained by his attempt to hide his
real intentions and his wish to make it look like he believed he had
given the right change whereas he didn’t in fact believe that. The point
of this second example is that if one were to claim of a given situation
that it can best be viewed as a situation in which someone understands
the behaviour of someone else merely through the attribution of a sin-
gle belief or desire, one needs to take great care to show that no
implicit background beliefs or desires are overlooked.
The relation between holism and interpretationism is a strong one.
If the point of attributing beliefs and desires is not to refer to an inde-
pendent mental reality but instead to make sense of the behaviour of
others, as Hutto has it,3 and if, as the examples above show, this
requires ascription of specific sets of interrelated beliefs and desires
then it is hard to imagine how one can be an interpretationist without
accepting mental holism. Having said that, though, the purpose of this
brief subsection is not to present a knock-down argument to the effect
that Hutto’s ontological commitments force him to abandon the com-
ponents-principles distinction. There are various forms of inter-
pretationism and it does not seem a priori impossible that on some
loose version of it some form of mental atomism is feasible. But if
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[3] Chris Sinha (2009) interprets Hutto in line with the phenomenological, hermeneutic and
Wittgensteinian approaches to mind, action and language of the verstehen tradition. Obvi-
ously, I agree.
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atomism and interpretationism are held to be compatible, that
compatibility certainly needs to be argued for.
2.2 Do empirical facts indicate a distinction between
FP components and FP ‘principles’?
Hutto does argue, in some sense at least, for the fact that young chil-
dren acquire the concepts of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ as full blown propo-
sitional attitudes prior to knowing how to interrelate them by
rehearsing and interpreting some empirical evidence from develop-
mental psychology. In Chapter 7 of his (2008a) he sketches the emer-
gence of these concepts in children from what I take to be a largely
interpretationist point of view. In some detail he shows how linguistic
competence extends the abilities involved in having a primitive grasp
of desires and beliefs as ‘mere’ intentional attitudes into abilities that
can be understood as having a grasp of beliefs and desires as proposi-
tional attitudes. In his account, Hutto takes care to emphasise the
extent to which the acquisition of full-blown concepts of ‘desires’ and
‘beliefs’ are independent: ‘Desires come first in our linguistically
scaffolded mentalistic understanding of things: children are capable
of attributing these long before they can make competent belief
ascriptions’ (Hutto, 2008a, pp. 135–6). In this subsection I want to
argue that it is not at all clear that this does indeed show that the con-
cepts of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are indeed acquired before children grasp
the principles that interrelate them. Instead, I will argue, there is much
to be said for the opposite.
First, a preliminary observation. Though it is well documented that
the ‘linguistically scaffolded’ concept of ‘desire’ precedes the ‘lin-
guistically scaffolded’ concept of ‘belief’ by some six months, this
does not mean that the development of these concepts can be sepa-
rated entirely. For both concepts build on earlier acquired non-linguis-
tic abilities that are often (in my view overconfidently and somewhat
misleadingly) referred to as the ‘nonverbal’ grasp of ‘beliefs’ and ‘de-
sires’. The first occurrences of these abilities are not easily or
uncontroversially separated temporarily. At any rate, both abilities (I
deliberately avoid ‘concepts’ which I shall reserve for linguistically
scaffolded abilities) occur long before their linguistic counterparts do.
Thus, though controversial, it is claimed that 18-month olds already
have some understanding of the desire of others:
(…) [C]hildren were shown two bowls, one of goldfish crackers and one
containing broccoli. The experimenter would look cheerfully at the
broccoli and say ‘Yum!’ and make a disgusted face toward the crackers
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and say ‘Yuck!’Then the experimenter would hold out her hand and ask,
‘Can you give me some?’ (…) 18-month-olds succeed in giving the
experimenter the one that she showed a preference for, broccoli, even
though it is not their own choice (Bloom, 2004, pp. 18–9).
Similarly, (and also controversially) Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)
have claimed that 15 month-olds have some grasp of the false beliefs
of others, using a violation-of-expectation version of the false belief
task. Southgate et al. (2007) criticise this study for being ambiguous:
the results can also be explained by the assumption that children
attribute ignorance instead of false beliefs. But they themselves pres-
ent a disambiguated version of the non-verbal false belief task, show-
ing that 25-month olds appear to pass it. It is far from clear how we
should interpret these data (see e.g. Herschbach, 2008). But it does
seem clear that long before children acquire a linguistic concept of
‘desire’, which is six months prior to acquiring the concept of ‘belief’,
they have been able to make non-linguistic ‘attributions’ that are at
least in some sense predecessors of both the concepts of belief and
desire.
So, when children develop the linguistic concept of ‘desire’
(around 3.5 years of age) it is not entirely true that this concept exists
in isolation. Still, it is a well established fact that 3.5-year olds are able
to attribute desires linguistically while not being able to attribute
beliefs in that way. The first point I’d like to make is that, also in view
of the previous remark about non-linguistic predecessors, there does
not seem to be a clear demarcation of when a child can be said to have
acquired a full-blown concept of a specific propositional attitude — it
all depends on what one calls ‘a concept’. And given this, one begs the
question against the mental holist when it is said that the concept of
‘desire’ is acquired before knowing how to interrelate it with e.g. the
concept of ‘belief’. It makes perfectly good sense, from the point of
view of the holist, to say that a child hasn’t acquired the full blown
concept of ‘desire’ until she knows how it interacts with beliefs. If it is
the case that a 3.5-year old does not know how a desire and a belief
interrelate (the possibility of a linguistic concept of ‘desire’ interact-
ing with a non-linguistic context in which there is a primitive grasp of
beliefs, remains open), then she has acquired a proto-version of the
concept of ‘a desire’ but not the real thing yet. The case for isolated
desire concepts is inconclusive to say the least.
As for beliefs, Hutto’s case is even less strong, for the simple reason
that by the time children are said to acquire that concept (by the age of
4), the linguistic ability to attribute desires is already in place. There
may certainly seem to be instances in which children explain actions
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in terms of isolated belief attribution. But here we need to ask whether
the lesson of the second example of the previous section is sufficiently
heeded: are we sure there are no implicit desire attributions that play a
role in the background? Consider what may seem to be a paradigmatic
example of action explanation/prediction based on the attribution of a
single belief: Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith’s (1985) version of the
false belief task, the so-called Sally-Ann test. Here’s the standard
picture that is used to illustrate the test:
The semi-final sentence makes the background-desire, in co-opera-
tion with which the false belief is supposed to explain Sally’s looking
in the basket, entirely explicit. And even if we were to erase that sen-
tence, the transition from ‘now Sally comes back’ to ‘where will Sally
look for the ball’ obviously presupposes that Sally wants her ball. It
would be absurd to claim that children do not understand the
belief-desire interaction going on here. It is overwhelmingly likely
that they do. And the possibility that they co-determine each other’s
role and meaning is entirely open.
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The standard picture illustrating the Sally-Ann test
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Hutto does not deny this. He gives a wonderful three-page descrip-
tion of how the concept of ‘belief’ develops out of the cognitive fric-
tion that is certain to emerge in the conversational interplay that
children in between 3 and 4 years are capable of. It is almost unthink-
able (though Hutto is silent on this) that this interplay at all times
avoids what we would characterise as belief-desire interactions e.g. of
the kind illustrated by the first example in the previous section. Indeed
Hutto writes that ‘children are more or less simultaneously learning
what beliefs are while also becoming familiar with the specific role
they play in folk-psychology. For it is during the period of 3 to 4 years
of age that they start having the relevant kinds of conversational inter-
play with caregivers as well as being introduced to people narratives’
(Hutto, 2008a, p. 138). This statement is, at least at first glance, at
odds with the separation of FP components and FP principles. The
consistency of Hutto’s position might appear to be saved by empha-
sizing that narratives are introduced as an item that is logically distinct
from the acquisition of beliefs. But the same cannot be claimed of con-
versational interchange: Hutto does describe the emergence of the con-
cept of belief as requiring interchange and hence in all likelihood as
being a product of having witnessed many belief-desire interactions.
Thus, even to some extent by Hutto’s own standards, it is very plau-
sible that children know how beliefs and desires interact from the
moment they have the full concept of ‘a belief’; the separation of FP
components and FP principles cannot be illustrated by means of refer-
ring to the developmental psychological facts. And the kind of inter-
action that children seem to be aware of is exactly the kind mental
holists refer to. Indeed it is of the kind presupposed by externalist TT.
2.3 The threat of collapse and a different strategy to avoid it
The fact that Hutto says that children start being exposed to (folk-
psychological) narratives in between the ages of 3 and 4 does not
mean that his claim is that by the age of 4 children have a rudimentary
grasp of FP. On the contrary, while TT-ists claim that when children
can pass the false belief test by the age of 4 (see, however, Carpendale
& Lewis, 2004) this marks their ability to wield a primitive version of
FP, Hutto argues that it is precisely the fact that children are only able
to understand reason explanations at later ages — approximately from
the age of 5 onwards — that illustrates the fact that passing the test is
not enough for FP. The continued exposure to narratives, apparently,
is needed, according to Hutto, for true FP competence.
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What, then, is the relation between the knowledge of simple belief-
desire interactions that children possess by the age of 4 (see previous
section) and full blown FP competence? Precisely because Hutto does
not admit that children by the age of 4 have at least some understand-
ing of FP principles, he does not answer this question. But from his
book and his many articles an answer can be distilled: complexity and
subtlety. Full FP competence differs from the simple belief-desire
psychology I claim children of 4 years acquire knowledge of, by being
infinitely more complex (e.g. in plotting the interrelations of the atti-
tudes with all sorts of other mental states such as emotions and percep-
tions as well as with items such as character traits and moods) and
subtle (e.g. in charting how circumstances and a range of other vari-
ables might be relevant).
If this is indeed the relation between the simple belief-desire psy-
chology of the 4-year old and the full blooded FP of adults, then it
seems Hutto has no argument against the external TT-ist who claims
that the narrative structure of FP does not exclude the idea that FP
implicitly is still a term-introducing theory. Once it is recognized that
the simple belief-desire psychology of, say, the false belief test is pre-
cisely the sort of psychology that proponents of ETT wish to draw on
when devising their notion of FP as a term-introducing theory (‘this is
how the notion of a belief functions: if you want x, believe that y-ing
will get you x, you will y, ceteris paribus’), complexity and subtlety
introduced through narratives will not help to make full-blown FP
non-theoretical. It will only serve to make full-blown FP a complex
and subtle theory.
Here, the way out for the NPH might seem to be to argue that the
simple belief-desire psychology of the 4-year old is already narrative
by nature. Indeed in the passage I quoted at the end of the previous
subsection, that is what Hutto appears to do. And indeed, the Sally-
Ann example is an example of a story! But this move does not help. If
simple belief-desire psychology is called ‘narrative’, this very much
undermines the informativeness of the notion of ‘a narrative’. The
NPH depends, as a theory distinct from TT, on the contrast between
the notion of ‘a story’ and the notion of ‘a theory’. This contrast disap-
pears (especially given the absence of a definition of ‘narrative’ that
sets it apart from ‘theory’) when one of the prime examples of the
belief-desire interactions that serves to illustrate the idea of a
term-introducing theory is called a narrative. Calling simple belief-
desire interactions narratives will only encourage those who suspect
that the NPH is a variety of implicit ETT.
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But note that this threat of collapse of the NPH into a form of TT
hinges on the idea that full-blown FP reason explanation is continuous
with simple belief-desire psychology. By rejecting the idea that
full-blown FP explanation is just a more complex form of the same
type of belief-desire psychology that ETT accounts for, (i) the appar-
ent compatibility of the NPH with ETT as outlined in section 1, and
(ii) the failure of Hutto’s anti-holism strategy against ETT can be
shown not to amount to the collapse of the NPH into ETT. Compatibil-
ity does not amount to a collapse when full-blown FP explanation is
discontinuous with simple belief-desire psychology in the sense that
the narrative element in FP explanation that is stressed by the NPH is a
further addition to belief-desire psychology that is beyond the reach
of ETT. I will argue for such discontinuity, and hence against the
collapse of the NPH into TT, in the next section.
3. The Division of Labour between Belief-Desire
Interaction and Narrativity
In this section I will argue that the idea of a discontinuity between sim-
ple belief-desire psychology and full blown FP reason explanation is,
despite being unorthodox, indeed highly plausible. Narrative FP
explanations do involve belief-desire structures. But the contribution
of narratives to the explanation of actions cannot, I claim, be
understood as an extension in the direction of complexity, context-
dependence and subtlety of belief-desire schemata.
3.1 Some examples and their analysis
In order to distinguish the roles of belief-desire interaction on the one
hand and narratives on the other in full-blown FP explanations of
actions, it will be helpful to consider some examples of such explana-
tions. Oddly enough, there are not that many examples of full-blown
narrative explanations of actions to be found in Hutto’s book. A strik-
ing one, though, is to be found in the beginning of the book. It is about
the explanation of some initially incomprehensible behaviour by
Hutto’s wife. Hutto writes:
On the morning of my flight [my wife] agreed to drive me to Heathrow
after I had first dropped off my car at the garage. So, we set off in our
separate cars and she took the lead (…). As we came to the relevant
intersection, she stopped at a set of red traffic lights, but uncharacteristi-
cally failed to signal. (…) To my amazement when the lights changed
she did not turn, began driving towards the town center, straight past the
garage at which she herself made the booking. (…) At this point, I was
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faced with a rather tricky interpretive problem. Given that my wife is
very competent and reliable, lacking any malicious streak or any known
reason to treat me badly, I was at an utter loss to make sense of her
actions (Hutto, 2008a, pp. 18–9).
Afterwards, Hutto’s wife’s explained her behaviour in narrative form:
(…) After the incident she explained that although it was true that she
had phoned the garage to make the appointment herself, and she had
used the number I had given her, she believed it was the number of our
old garage, which is located in the next village (Hutto, 2008a,
pp. 19–20).
This example typically shows what Hutto takes to be the point of nar-
rative FP explanations: ‘Folk psychological narratives are used to
make sense of (…) seemingly aberrant actions. Typically — or at
least when they work — they help us to understand why someone has
acted in a way that has strayed from our normal expectations (on the
assumption that they have acted for a reason nonetheless’ (Hutto,
2008a, p. 37). This idea about the function of narrative explanation
is shared by Alisdair Macintyre (MacIntyre, 1981). Consider the
following example:
I am standing waiting for a bus and the young man standing next to me
suddenly says: ‘The name of the common wild duck is Histrionicus
histrionicus histrionicus.’ There’s no problem as to the meaning of the
sentence he uttered: the problem is, how to answer the question, what
was he doing in uttering it? Suppose he just uttered such sentences at
random intervals; this would be one possible form of madness. We
would render his action of utterence intelligible if one of the following
turned out to be true. He has mistaken me for someone who had yester-
day approached him in the library and asked: ‘Do you by any chance
know the Latin name of the common wild duck?’ Or he has just come
from a session with his psychotherapist who has urged him to break
down his shyness by talking to strangers. ‘But what shall I say?’ ‘Oh,
anything at all.’ Or he is a Soviet spy waiting at a prearranged
rendez-vous and uttering the ill-chosen code sentence which will iden-
tify him to his contact. In each case the act of utterance becomes intelli-
gible by identifying its place in a narrative (Macintyre, 1981, p. 210).4
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[4] Macintyre also seems to agree with Hutto (or, given the fact that Macintyre’s book
appeared in 1981, Hutto with Macintyre) on the genesis of our narrative FP capabilities: ‘It
is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided
kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must
make their own way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous
living and go into exile to live with the swine, that children learn or mis-learn both what a
child and what a parent is, what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they
have been born and what the ways of the world are. Deprive children of stories and you
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These are helpful examples. But what do they show? Do they show
that there are highly complex schemes of beliefs and desires at play in
narrative explanations in which these beliefs and desires interact with
other psychological states, situations, character traits, etc. They
might. But I think there is a much more elegant and clear analysis.
Take Hutto’s own example. Behind the story, a fairly simple
belief-desire structure is visible. Hutto’s wife:
wants to drive him to the airport after having dropped his car off at the
garage.
She also
believes that the phone number Hutto gave her was the number of their
old garage, so that the appointment she had made was an appointment
with that old garage in another village.
There are, of course numerous background beliefs (about traffic
lights, traffic rules about when to signal, etc.) and desires (wanting to
abide by the rules when driving, etc.) at play. But that is also the case
in the most simple belief-desire explanations (think about Sally’s
background belief that balls do not change place by themselves and
usually stay where they are put). So these background beliefs and
desires are not at play because of any narrative involvement; which is
exactly why Hutto omits them too in his recounting of this particular
narrative explanation. Where, then, does narrativity enter in this
example?
Well, look at the individual belief and the individual desire cited
above. The belief that ‘the phone number Hutto gave his wife was the
number of their old garage, so that the appointment she had made was
an appointment with that old garage in another village’ itself contains
a narrative. And similarly for the desire ‘to drive Hutto to the airport
after having dropped his car off at the garage’. That is what the narra-
tive element does in this particular example: it fills in the individual
belief and desire of an otherwise simple explanatory belief-desire
scheme, rendering the belief and the desire themselves very complex.
But not by breaking them down into further beliefs and desires. Even
if that were a possibility, it would be cognitively much more
labourious than the narrative procedure of inserting a compressed
sequence of events relevant to the action to be explained, leaving all
the attitudes that might have been involved aside (note that the narra-
tive contents of the above belief and desire do not contain further
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attitudes). Compare this with the same simple belief-desire scheme in
the Sally-Ann case: Sally wants her ball and believes it is in the basket.
That’s it. The difference with Hutto’s example, the difference that
narrativity makes, is in the complexity, not of the belief-desire
scheme, but in the belief and the desire themselves.
The outcome of an explanation in which the beliefs and the desires
themselves have a narrative form is that the action that is explained is
made intelligible not merely as the logical result of attitudes immedi-
ately preceding the action, but as a part of a longer story, i.e. as coher-
ently fitting into the agents autobiography. This diachronic element in
the explanation is not a part of the belief-desire interaction that 4
year-olds are to some extent capable of understanding, it is a part of
the narrative contents of the belief and the desire themselves that 4
year olds are not yet capable to entertain. The work that is done by
narrativity in Hutto’s example is different from the work that is being
done by the ‘formal’ belief-desire interaction. The simple belief-
desire structure in Hutto’s narrative explanation is the skeleton of the
explanation. The real work in the explanation is done by the narratives
that have the form of a belief and a desire. To use a different metaphor,
the belief-desire structure is the canvas on which the actual narrative
explanation is painted.
What about Macintyre’s example? In the first reading of the exam-
ple, the person standing next to Macintyre (or the ‘I’ in the example) at
the bus stop believes that he has met Macintyre in the library yesterday
when Macintyre (or the ‘I’) asked him what the Latin name of the
common duck is while he failed to provide the answer he now has
ready at hand. He desires to help Macintyre (or the ‘I’) by providing
him with the answer, even if it is one day late. Again, there is a simple
belief-desire structure (again with a huge background of other beliefs
and desires not relevant to the narrativity at play) which provides the
skeleton of the explanation. And again the individual belief and desire
are filled-in by the narratives. The same analysis applies to the other
two readings, but I take it that the point is clear.
What is the role of narratives relative to the belief-desire structure
of an explanation? I would say it is the chunking — in the psycholo-
gist’s sense of ‘compressing’ — of large amounts of diachronically
ordered information relevant to the explanation of the action. The nar-
ratives that ‘fill’ the beliefs and desires of full-blown FP explanations
do not merely summarise more beliefs and desires, they do something
more. They introduce a diachronic ‘logic’ to the events that are either
believed or desired. On the one hand this diachronic logic makes a
large amount of information highly tractable by highlighting only
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relevant events, where ‘relevant’ means ‘relevant to the story’. On the
other hand this diachronic logic makes it possible to make an action
intelligible by letting it fit into this logic from the point of view of the
agent.
So, this is the hypothesis: children by the age of 4 have mastered
simple belief-desire interaction (to some extent at least), but they have
not yet acquired the ability to chunk large amounts of diachronically
ordered information in the specific way that is relevant to mature FP
explanations. For that they need to acquire narrative competency. And
they start to acquire that, roughly, from the age of 5 onwards. In this
respect it is interesting to note (as Hutto does in a footnote, 2008a,
p. 254) that
whereas pre-school-aged children tend to connect events in a linear
fashion, 5-year olds begin to use complex syntax to impose a causal
temporal hierarchy that contrasts important events with background
information (Capps et al., 2000, p. 201).
That, I hypothesize, is precisely what narratives do: compress dia-
chronically ordered and structured information, highlighting the rele-
vant bits. That information, thus compressed, gets fed into the
belief-desire structures children already are familiar with.
3.2 Persons
But there is more that narratives do than just compress information.
They structure diachronically related events in a specific format (the
MP3 of FP), i.e. along the axes of embodied persons as diachronically
existing unified characters. The point I want to make in this short sub-
section is that the acquisition of narrative abilities by children after
they have acquired some insight into belief-desire interaction can be
characterized by the development of the notion of ‘a person’ or ‘a self’
as a diachronically coherent agent.
Unlike Hutto, Macintyre makes a point of highlighting the fact that
the notion of an agent, person or self as a diachronically unified being
on the one hand and the notion of a narrative, story or history on the
other require each other. For Macintyre it is even impossible for us to
construe the idea of personal identity without our narrative
capabilities:
Empiricists (…) tried to give an account of personal identity solely in
terms of psychological states or events. Analytical philosophers, in so
many ways their heirs as well as their critics, have wrestled with the
connection between those states and events a strict identity (…). Both
have failed to see that a background has been omitted, the lack of which
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makes the problems insoluble. That background is provided by the con-
cept of a story and the kind of unity of character which a story requires
(Macintyre, 1981, p. 217).
We need not go as far as Macintyre does with respect to the problem of
personal identity in order to appreciate the relevance of this to our
present discussion: persons-as-diachronically-unified-selves are an
inalienable part of the FP narratives Hutto’s NPH is about. So, if nar-
rative competence starts to emerge around the age of 5, that is when
children start to grasp the idea of people as psychologically diachroni-
cally unified agents. Of course smaller children also have a grasp of,
say, their parents as diachronically continuous beings. But just like the
abilities underlying what Hutto calls ‘unprincipled bodily engage-
ments’ get transformed through the use of language into belief-desire
psychology (Hutto, 2008a, ch. 5–7), there is a further transformation
marked by the acquisition of narrative capacities: the primitive
embodied notion of ‘person’ becomes a diachronically unified psy-
chological entity, a self. Note again that we need not go as far as Mac-
intyre does: it may be the case that narratives constitute selves, so that
the ability to grasp narratives allows for the emergence of the FP
notion of ‘a person’. But it may just as well be that by the age of 5 chil-
dren start to acquire the capacity to grasp the idea of the diachronic
unity of psychological beings as such. And that may parallel the emer-
gence of narrative capacities, or even explain it. It is even more likely,
to my mind, that there really is no fact of the matter here about which
side is right. Keeping the quote by Capps et al. at the end of the previ-
ous subsection in mind, I would say that it is most likely that both nar-
rative capacities and the concept of persons or selves arise from
developments in the syntactical abilities of 5-year olds as two sides of
the same coin. Thus, the idea is that just as unprincipled bodily
engagements get transformed through language into belief-desire
psychology by the age of 4, a further development of linguistic abili-
ties allows for the introduction of the notion of persons by the age of 5;
not so much as a term that is used as frequently as ‘believes that’ or
‘wants to’, but as the characteristic ‘compression format’ of
narrativity.
3.3 Conclusion
The functions of narrativity in FP explanations — compressing infor-
mation, introducing a diachronic logic to events from the viewpoint of
the agent, introducing the notion of a diachronically coherent person
in reason explanations, etc. — cannot be reduced to the functions of
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belief-desire interaction. That, at least, was the point of this section.
Since ETT is merely about the interaction of propositional attitudes —
however sophisticated and complex — it follows that mature FP
explanations fall outside the scope of ETT to the extent that they
involve narrativity. The compatibility of the NPH with ETT (Section
1) and the improbability of the anti-holism attack on ETT (Section 2),
then, do not and cannot amount to a collapse of the NPH into ETT.
Moreover, Hutto’s claim that TT doesn’t explain real-life FP (or FP
stricto sensu) remains intact. Not, however, because all versions of it
are crucially wrong, but because all versions of it leave something
crucial out.
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